Naval War College Review
Volume 61
Number 1 Winter

Article 16

2008

Counterterrorism Strategies
Jonathan Stevenson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Stevenson, Jonathan (2008) "Counterterrorism Strategies," Naval War College Review: Vol. 61 : No. 1 , Article 16.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/16

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Stevenson: Counterterrorism Strategies
134

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

nexus of domestic and foreign pressures
means trouble for regional stability in
Asia. As Chinese citizens increasingly
scrutinize Beijing’s relations with the
outside world, the Chinese Communist
Party can ill afford to look soft on
hot-button foreign policy questions.
The party’s obsession with internal stability thus compels Beijing to guard vigilantly against foreign insults to China’s
national honor—a critical source of the
regime’s legitimacy. Consequently,
more than ever before, Beijing is
primed to overreact to external crises
and trigger confrontations that might
otherwise have been averted by more
temperate responses.
Overall, Shirk makes a compelling case
about this peculiar dilemma that
Beijing confronts. Although the proposition that the international community
ought to be more concerned about
China’s weaknesses rather than its
strengths is not new, her coverage of its
domestic challenges is quite informative. In particular, Shirk provides a useful framework for understanding
Beijing’s internal priorities—leadership
unity, social harmony, and tight control
of the military—that would be instantly
recognizable to those familiar with
Clausewitz’s famous “paradoxical trinity.” The analysis of China’s prickly ties
with Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States, however, covers well-trodden
ground, material that has been widely
documented in other studies.
As a former deputy assistant secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Shirk writes with authority on
U.S. diplomatic encounters with the
Chinese during the Clinton administration. Her extensive interviews with Chinese policy makers, senior military
officers, scholars, students, and “netizens”
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not only attest to the unusual degree of
access she has accumulated during her
tenure but enliven the narrative with
fascinating vignettes.
Nevertheless, this study is hobbled by
an apparent reluctance to revisit basic
assumptions about the regime itself,
which, after all, the author contends, is
fragile. Shirk does not render crucial
judgments about the viability of
China’s regime-sustaining strategies,
vaguely observing that “[Beijing] may
be capable of surviving for years to
come so long as the economy continues
to grow and create jobs.” Thus the validity of the book’s findings rests almost
entirely on the premise that the Chinese
Communist Party in its current form
will endure indefinitely. The analytical
consequences of this unwillingness to
explore alternative futures are evident
from the author’s boilerplate policy
prescriptions for the United States, including an injunction that Washington
must live with China’s repressive domestic policies.
But what if Shirk’s cautious optimism
about the regime’s longevity is wrong?
This unsettling question awaits another
forward-thinking China watcher.
TOSHI YOSHIHARA

Forest Hills, New York

Alexander, Yonah, ed. Counterterrorism Strategies:
Successes and Failures of Six Nations. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2006. 283pp. $24
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eds. How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics
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Since the attacks of 11 September, a
kind of conventional wisdom about
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counterterrorism has emerged. On one
hand, the “new terrorism” involves the
violent expression of a radical religious
agenda, suicide attackers, and masscasualty violence. It is, therefore, both
harder to deter and more destructive
than the old ideological and ethnonationalist varieties of terrorism, whose
practitioners, in Brian Michael Jenkins’s
now classic (and obsolete) formulation,
wanted a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead. On the other hand,
the takedown, led by the United States,
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
forced the operational core of al-Qa‘ida
to disperse and the transnational terrorism network to become even more flat
and decentralized. This meant that operational initiative was increasingly left
to local “upstart” cells, which, though
perhaps aided by al-Qa‘ida middlemen,
were merely inspired rather than directed by the central leadership.
The upshot is that the new foot soldiers
of the global jihad may be motivated
less by the cultural humiliation of Islam
at the hands of the West or Osama Bin
Laden’s redemptive grand vision of a
global caliphate than by local or regional social conditions, onto which
they simply graft that ideal and thereby
generate greater energy, purpose, and
focus. In Europe, the main culprits may
be the political and economic marginalization of Muslims in their host countries and their bitter memories of
colonial abuses. In the Middle East, the
gravamen of the radical Muslim complaint could be the plight of the Palestinians or the perceived co-optation of
Arab regimes by the United States and
other Western powers. In the Philippines, it might be the refusal of the state
to accord Muslims political parity and a
measure of autonomy.
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In accord with these views, the perception has evolved among counterterrorism experts that containing the Islamist
terrorist movement requires disaggregating it into regional and sometimes
local elements and devising customized
policies to deal with them. Effective
policies will inevitably entail direct applications of soft as well as hard power—
in particular, conflict resolution and
state building. Also, successful applications of soft power are likely to have a
more positive effect on Muslim perceptions of non-Muslim governments than
are exercises of hard power. Two new
edited volumes of essays, Yonah Alexander’s Counterterrorism Strategies and
Doron Zimmermann and Andreas
Wenger’s How States Fight Terrorism,
approach the challenge of terrorism in
the post-9/11 world on a state-by-state
basis. In doing so, they appear to certify
this evolving view, and with it the corollary that although the global jihadist
movement is in many ways transnational
and virtual, it admits of no holistic solution. Even if there was, one might add,
existing multilateral and supranational
organizations would be incapable of
implementing it.
Alexander’s book is a workmanlike
and highly competent compendium of
substantially descriptive historical case
studies of counterterrorism approaches
in the United States, selected European
countries (France, Germany, and Italy), one Arab state (Egypt), and Sri
Lanka, bracketed by the editor’s introduction and summary with conclusions. Those conclusions are perhaps
the probative elements of the volume,
as Alexander in them attempts to distill from the case studies a range of
constructive counterterrorism policies.
But the proffered list tends either to
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state the obvious (“prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
to rogue states and terrorist groups”)
or confirm admonitions that have already been made in abundance (“increase cooperative relationships and
alliances with like-minded nations”).
Furthermore, probably because Alexander’s study was initiated in 1998—
that is, before 9/11—the choice of case
studies is arguably misaimed. Egypt’s
pre-9/11 experience is relevant precisely because it is a formative aspect
of the transnationalization of Islamist
terrorism and the rise of al-Qa‘ida,
and the Tamil Tigers’ activity in Sri
Lanka is worthy of study also because
of their persistence and innovation
(for instance, suicide attacks). However, one key European state, from a
counterterrorism standpoint—the
United Kingdom—is completely
excluded.
Zimmermann and Wenger’s book, unlike Alexander’s, was undertaken at the
specific prompting of the 9/11 attacks
and jihadist terrorism. It constitutes a
more incisive and structurally oriented
look at issues and challenges, namely,
those peculiar to counterterrorism in
the post-9/11 epoch. Indeed, following
a trenchant introduction outlining the
contemporary challenge, the first chapter, by Laura K. Donahue, deals comprehensively with the United Kingdom,
aptly summing up the British dispensation as having “not been a radical departure from the previous state of
affairs but rather an acceleration of the
state’s counterterrorist strategy.” This
volume also contains chapters on countries like Norway that have had little
counterterrorism experience and those
like Canada whose security policies are
overdetermined by strong and
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prominent neighbors. Given the wide
transnational presence of the global
jihadist movement and the potential
problems it poses to states heretofore
untouched by (or at least insulated
from) terrorism, the inclusion of such
states seems wise. The chapter on the
United States by RAND analyst William
Rosenau is nuanced and marked by
calm pragmatism. Rosenau stresses that
even transnational Islamist terrorism as
perpetrated by al-Qa‘ida does not qualify as an existential threat to the United
States and intimates that treating it as
such could unduly skew national priorities—and may already have done so.
Martin van Creveld’s fine but largely
historical treatment appears at first
blush to be something of a non sequitur, but it may have been included to illustrate (as it does) the attritional
effects that a long-term terrorist campaign can have on a modern state and
military in the absence of political
resolution.
Rohan Gunaratna’s thorough but familiar assessment, entitled “Combating
Al-Qaida and Associated Groups,”
counsels that “governments should
move from traditional cooperation to
collaboration,” if the global network is
to be neutralized. It characterizes the
war in Iraq as counterproductively antagonistic to radical Muslims and suggests that regional conflicts will have to
be ameliorated to tame them. Such recommendations, while generally sensible,
may get ahead of the other material in
the book. However, the editors’ excellent
concluding essay nicely grounds the volume by casting the central counterterrorism task as striking a “balance . . .
between the efficiency of the legal, political, civilian and military means used
to combat terrorism, on the one hand,
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and their legitimacy in the eyes of the
affected constituencies, on the other.”
Overall, the two books do an estimable
job of delineating programmatically
what states seeking to counter terrorism
can and need to do. In so doing, they
also invite more specific and granular
analyses of precisely how to do it.

to electric shock and water boarding.
He was even administered Pentothal, or
“truth serum.” Despite these outrages,
Alleg refused to break, earning him
both wrath and grudging respect from
his tormentors. He escaped from prison
in October 1961, just months before the
war ended.

JONATHAN STEVENSON

Fifty years later, Alleg’s voice remains as
reasoned and penetrating as ever. He laments that France’s political elite have
attempted to purge the Algerian War
and its attendant horrors from the
country’s official memory; many military men responsible for these crimes,
he notes, have received not only amnesty but promotion and praise. Only
in 2000 did the French government admit that it had perpetrated widespread
torture and other abuses during this period. Ironically, one former torturer
proudly admitted to his actions in a
2001 book, causing such a backlash that
he was punished, albeit lightly. However, Alleg insists that even this slap on
the wrist signals a shift in official
French thinking.

Naval War College

Alleg, Henri. The Question. Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 2006. 74pp. $16.95

During France’s Algerian War (1954–
62), the French journalist Henri Alleg
sided with the insurgents. Arrested by
French authorities in June 1957, Alleg
was detained and tortured. During his
confinement he managed to write and
smuggle out an account of his experiences. Originally published in 1958,
The Question was quickly banned by
the French government, the first such
action France had taken since the eighteenth century. The book nonetheless
became a sensation.
Reissued after half a century, this new
edition retains its preface by French
novelist and philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre, now supplemented with a foreword by author Ellen Ray, an introduction by author James D. Le Sueur, and a
new afterword by Alleg himself.
The book’s title euphemistically refers
to torture. In calm and lucid prose,
Alleg describes his fate at the hands of
his captors. Held for a month in Algeria’s El Biar prison, Alleg was tortured
by French paras (paratroopers) before
being transferred to another prison,
where he composed The Question. His
“interrogations” ranged from beatings
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The accompanying essays deserve mention. Ray minces no words, accusing
the United States of pursuing a “strategy that incorporates racism, torture,
and murder” in its current conflicts.
Seeing America as headed down a moral
slippery slope, she wonders if it might go
the way of the French Fourth Republic
or whether “Americans might be the defendants in future war crimes trials.”
Le Sueur provides background on
Alleg’s experiences and the debate that
The Question aroused in France. He argues that present-day France has yet to
come to grips with its sordid conduct.
In fact, the French parliament passed a
law in February 2005 enjoining educators to teach the “positive role” of
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